Facing a Legislative Straightjacket in the 21st Century: North Carolina Courts and the Prayer for Judgement Continued by Gonder-Stanley, Dionne R.
North Carolina Central Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 1 Article 3 
2017 
Facing a Legislative Straightjacket in the 21st Century: North 
Carolina Courts and the Prayer for Judgement Continued 
Dionne R. Gonder-Stanley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gonder-Stanley, Dionne R. (2017) "Facing a Legislative Straightjacket in the 21st Century: North Carolina 
Courts and the Prayer for Judgement Continued," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 40 : No. 1 , 
Article 3. 
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol40/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship 
Digital Archives. For more information, please contact nperry@nccu.edu. 
32
Facing a Legislative Straightjacket in the 21st Century: North
Carolina Courts and the Prayer for Judgment Continued
DIONNE R. GONDER-STANLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2009, James Johnson pled guilty to attempted
misprision of a felony. This was based on his admission that, out of
fear, he wiped fingerprints from a victim’s car and thereby assisted a
murderer’s attempt to cover up a *004 killing.1 In January 2011,
Paula Harrison pled guilty to drug trafficking and other felony drug
offenses because she was involved in the sale of prescription pills
with two teenaged accomplices.2 Johnson and Harrison differed as
much in their demographic characteristics as they did in the nature of
* Clinical Associate Professor, North Carolina Central University School of Law. I wish to thank all of
my colleagues, who provided support and motivation in too many ways to name here, and former law
students Megan L. Mitchell and Priscilla (Cooper) McKoy, who provided ideas and research assistance
in the early stages of this work.
1. See N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Ct. Info. Public Records Search [hereinafter, “N.C. CIPRS”],
Case Details for State v. James Johnson, Nos. 07 CRS 56748 & 09 CRS 767 (Wilson Co.) (last searched
on Sept. 6, 2017); Editorial, A Case Closes, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2009.
2. See N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Paula Harrison, Nos. 10 CRS 52899-52900 (Johnston
Co.) (last searched on Sept. 6, 2017); Thomasi McDonald, Daughter of Wake Sheriff Makes Deal in Drug
Case, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 12, 2011 (Crime/Safety).
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their crimes. Johnson was an eighteen year-old black male at the
time of his offense.3 Harrison was a forty-two year-old white female
and the daughter of a sheriff at the time of her crimes.4 Despite these
differences, the outcome of these defendants’ cases was the same.
The trial court judges accepted their guilty pleas.5 Then, instead of
selecting a punishment and pronouncing a judgment in accordance
with the sentencing scheme created by ,orth Carolina’s legislature,
the judge in each case ordered that the prayer for judgment would be
continued.6 Neither judge imposed imprisonment, probation, a fine,
or any other legally recognized component of criminal punishment in
North Carolina.7 Both defendants escaped the immediate imposition
of punishment for their offenses and have not had a final judgment
entered against them.8
3. See NC CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1, No. 09 CRS 767 at 1.
4. See N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Harrison, supra note 2, No. 10 CRS 52899 at 1;
McDonald, supra note 2.
5. SeeNC CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1, No. 09 CRS 767 at 1; McDonald,
supra note 2.
6. SeeNC CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1, No. 09 CRS 767 at 1; McDonald,
supra note 2.
7. The only authorized types of criminal punishment in North Carolina are “death, imprisonment,
fines, suspension of a jail or prison term with or without conditions, restitution, community service, re-
straints on liberty, work programs, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office
of honor, trust, or profit under this State.” N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1.
8. According to computerized public records maintained by the North Carolina Administrative Of-
fice of the Courts, James Johnson’s case was disposed on the date of the order continuing the prayer for
judgment, but Paula Harrison’s case is still pending with no final judgment having been entered and with
2
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When someone is charged with committing a criminal or mo-
tor vehicle offense, the expectation is that some type of punishment
will follow a finding of guilt, whether that finding is based on a
guilty plea or on a verdict after trial.9 Defendants are expected to
stand before a judge and wait to hear the judge pronounce their fate.
In that moment, the defendant, court actors, and any observers won-
der what is going to happen. Will there be probation or a period of
incarceration? Will there be a fine and court costs to pay? Will the
judge be harsh or merciful because of information presented by the
prosecution and the defense? 10 As illustrated by the Johnson and
Harrison cases—North Carolina trial court judges can frustrate ex-
pectations and avoid pronouncing any judgment within the sentenc-
ing parameters set by the North Carolina legislature if they decide to
enter a prayer for judgment continued.
the last scheduled court date occurring in 2015. SeeN.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Harrison, supra
note 2; N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Pat Stith, et al., State Leaders Vow to Close Speed Loopholes, NEWS & OBSERVER,
May 22, 2007.
10. Under North Carolina law, trial court judges are empowered with discretion in many cases to
choose the proper punishment for a defendant from a defined range of penalties. See generally N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 15A-1340.10 et seq., 20-176, & 20-179 (2015).
3
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The prayer for judgment continued is a procedural device
where, in an exercise of discretionary authority, trial judges may re-
frain from entering a final judgment in any case they deem appropri-
ate.11 North Carolina trial court judges have exercised this type of
discretionary authority since the nineteenth century.12 The prayer for
judgment continued has remained in use through modern times be-
cause it serves important purposes within the North Carolina legal
system. Specifically, a trial +udge’s authority to continue prayer for
judgment provides (1) procedural fairness; (2) the ability to encour-
age resource-saving resolutions in cases; and (3) an opportunity to in-
novate alternative sentencing solutions when necessary.13
In the past, the North Carolina legislature appeared to
acknowledge the utility of the prayer for judgment continued because
it did very little to regulate the courts’ use of the device, and it did
not explicitly restrict a +udge’s authority to order a prayer for judg-
ment continued in any criminal or motor vehicle cases.14 The
11. See SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA §
12.5, at 913 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2015).
12. See State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 20 S.E. 513 (1894); State v. Bennett, 20 N.C. 170, 178 (1838).
See also Albert Coates, Punishment for Crime in North Carolina, 17 N.C. L. REV. 205, 215 (1938-1939).
13. See Part III infra.
14. See Part IV infra.
4
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twenty-first century, however, has been the advent of direct legisla-
tive restrictions that carve away at judicial authority and ignore the
important purposes served by the courts’ centuries-long power to
continue prayers for judgment.15 In response to this trend, trial courts
should take steps to encourage legislators—when contemplating ad-
ditional restrictions—to be cautious and mindful of the important
purposes served by the courts’ use of this device. The significant and
historic role of the prayer for judgment continued in the North Caro-
lina legal system must be maintained.
To provide context, Part II of this article summarizes North
Carolina legal doctrine regarding trial courts’ use of the prayer for
judgment continued in criminal and motor vehicle cases. Part III
then examines the three significant purposes served by the trial court
system’s use of this device in various cases. Part I' explores the leg-
islative response to prayers for judgment continued over time. After
addressing the source and scope of the ,orth Carolina legislature’s
authority in this area, Part IV describes the longstanding legislative
15. See Part IV infra.
5
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tradition of avoiding direct regulation of the courts’ use of prayers for
judgment continued and compares that tradition with the recent trend
of restricting the trial courts’ use of the device in various criminal
and motor vehicle cases. Finally, Part V proposes a few ways that
the court system might encourage legislators to return to a tradition
of restraint that will preserve the important benefits of having the
prayer for judgment continued to be available to North Carolina trial
judges.
II. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A COURT TO CONTINUE THE
PRAYER FOR JUDGMENT?: A DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW
Once a defendant is adjudged to be guilty of a criminal or motor
vehicle offense in North Carolina, a trial court judge has three op-
tions: “(1) To pronounce +udgment and place it into immediate exe-
cution; (2) to pronounce judgment and suspend or stay its execution;
[or] ()) to continue prayer for +udgment.”16 A “prayer for +udgment”
is simply the State’s re$uest, through the prosecutor, that a sentence
be imposed and a judgment be entered after a defendant has been
16. State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 682, 100 S.E.2d 49, 50 (1957). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
4.01(4a) (2015) (acknowledging that courts may continue the prayer for judgment in a motor vehicle
case).
6
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found to be guilty of an offense.17 The “prayer for judgment contin-
ued” is when a +udge deliberately “refuse[s] to enter a final +udg-
ment” against the defendant.18 The prayer for judgment continued is
a procedural device that has been used in the North Carolina court
system since at least the nineteenth century.19 With only a few ex-
ceptions,20 North Carolina trial judges have broad discretion to use
this device and have used it in cases as varied as (1) minor motor ve-
hicle offenses;21 (2) misdemeanor offenses such as simple assault;22
and (3) serious felony offenses, such as robbery with a dangerous
weapon23 or, as referenced above, the drug trafficking charges faced
by Paula Harrison.24 Although case law and statutes do not label the
17. See SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA
# 1*.5, at 914 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2015). See also Griffin, 246 N.C. at 683, 100 S.E.2d at 51
18. SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA# 1*.5
at 913 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2015).
19. See Whedbee v. Powell, 41 N.C. App. 250, 253, 254 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1979) (“The inherent
power of the court . . . to direct that prayer for judgment be continued[] has long been recognized in this
jurisdiction.”) (citing Crook, 115 N.C. at 760, 20 S.E. at 513).
20. Currently, the exceptions to a trial judge’s discretionary authority to continue prayer for judg-
ment are for the following types of charges: driving while impaired, speeding more than twenty-five miles
per hour over the limit, passing a school bus that has its stop arm activated, soliciting for the purpose of
prostitution, high-level felonies, and capital murder. See James M. Markham & Shea Riggsbee Denning,
NORTH CAROLINA SENTENCING HANDBOOK WITH FELONY, MISDEMEANOR, AND DWI SENTENCING
GRIDS at 14 (U.N.C. School of Gov’t 2016-2017 ed.); also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (2015).
21. 21. E.g., Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 540, 400 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1991) (noting
the entry of a prayer for judgment continued on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without a license).
22. E.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 363, 451 S.E.2d 858, 863 (1994).
23. E.g., State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 35, 612 S.E.2d 195, 197 (2005), cert. denied 359
N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196.
24. N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Harrison, supra note 2.
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various ways in which trial courts use prayers for judgment contin-
ued, for purposes of discussion in this article, the situations are cate-
gorized as follows: (1) the temporary prayer for judgment continued;
(2) the conditional prayer for judgment continued; and (3) the uncon-
ditional prayer for judgment continued.25
A temporary prayer for judgment continued is when the trial
court judge does not immediately pronounce a judgment and sen-
tence against a defendant but, instead, continues the sentencing hear-
ing for a short, determinate period of time, with the intent to impose a
judgment and sentence in the near future.26 As specifically approved
by the North Carolina Supreme Court, a trial judge might use a tem-
porary prayer for +udgment continued “for +udicial purposes . . . so as
to afford time to consider post-trial motions, to prevent a miscarriage
of justice, and for other like purposes contemplated by law and jus-
tice.”27 For example, after a lengthy trial, a judge might temporarily
25. This same labeling scheme was previously used by this author in an article calling for North
Carolina’s criminal practitioners to be attentive to issues surrounding legislative restrictions on the courts’
authority to continue prayer for judgment in cases. See Dionne R. Gonder-Stanley, Let’s Talk about the
Prayer for Judgment Continued (!PJC’), THE TRUE BILL, Vol. 23, No. 2 at 7 – 9 (Crim. Justice Sec. of
N.C. Bar Ass’n, Feb. 2012).
26. See, e.g., State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 155-156, 436 S.E.2d 365, 365 (1993) (where the trial
court initially continued prayer for judgment for thirty days and eventually pronounced the final judgment
and sentence five months after the defendant pled guilty).
27. In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 307, 255 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1979).
8
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continue the prayer for judgment to provide time for a presentence
investigation, and for the parties to otherwise prepare for the sentenc-
ing hearing.28 When the short-term continuance is over, the judge
will hold the sentencing hearing and pronounce a final judgment.29
In contrast to a temporary prayer for judgment continued, a trial
judge might use a prayer for judgment continued with the intent that,
barring unforeseen or changed circumstances, a final judgment and
sentence will never be entered for the offense.30 If the court uses this
approach in an individual case, the prayer for judgment continued
may be imposed with or without conditions.31 These conditional and
unconditional prayers for judgment continued are long-term or indef-
inite in duration,32 and may become the permanent disposition of the
28. See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 418-19, 268 S.E.2d 879, 880 (where trial court
continued prayer for judgment to await a presentence investigation and then pronounced judgment ap-
proximately one month later), cert. denied 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980).
29. See id.
30. See, e.g.,Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. at 43, 612 S.E.2d at 202 (trial judge issued a prayer for
judgment continued for two charged offenses because defendant’s sentence for other related offenses ap-
peared to be “enough time” in prison on the facts of the case), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196
(2005).
31. Compare State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 94-95, 340 S.E.2d 450, 455 (1986) (involving the entry of
a prayer for judgment continued without conditions) with Barbour v. Scheidt, 246 N.C. 169, 170, 97
S.E.2d 855, 856 (1957) (involving the entry of prayers for judgment continued that were conditioned upon
the payment of court costs) .
32. See, e.g., Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. at 43, 612 S.E.2d at 202 (trial judge originally continued
the prayer for judgment indefinitely), cert. denied 359 N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005); Perry, 316 N.C.
at 94, 340 S.E.2d at 455 (1986) (trial court continued the prayer for judgment “from term to term and
session to session” for no more than five years); State v. Cheek, 31 N.C. App. 379, 380, 229 S.E.2d 227,
227 (1976) (noting trial court order to continue the prayer for judgment for five years).
9
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cases in which they are used.33 The doctrinal rules applicable to such
prayers for judgment continued differ based on whether they are with
or without conditions.34
When using conditional prayers for judgment continued, trial
judges provide defendants with an opportunity to mitigate or avoid
the statutorily defined punishment for the offenses by requiring the
defendants to satisfy certain explicit conditions.35 A trial court judge
may not order a conditional prayer for judgment continued without a
defendant’s consent,36 but consent can be implied from a defendant’s
failure to request the entry of judgment.37 Also, a trial court judge
has no authority to enter a conditional prayer for judgment continued
when a defendant has been adjudged to be guilty of an offense for
33. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1381 (2015) (defining “disposition” for criminal cases to include a
guilty verdict or plea “even though prayer for judgment . . . be continued”).
34. See State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 157, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993) (“In this state, we have
made a distinction between cases in which prayer for judgment is continued with conditions imposed and
cases in which prayer for judgment is continued without any conditions.”).
35. See Cheek, 31 N.C. App. at 380, 229 S.E.2d at 227 (trial court continued the prayer for judgment
on condition that the defendant avoid breaking any laws and not attempt a prison escape).
36. See State v. Jaynes, 198 N.C. 728, ___, 153 S.E. 410, 411 (1930) (reversing a trial court’s issu-
ance of a conditional prayer for judgment continued when the defendant objected to the order); State v.
Burgess, 192 N.C. 668, ___, 135 S.E. 771, 772 (1926) (finding that a trial court may not enter a conditional
PJC over a defendant ‘s objection because the defendant “had a substantial right that some final judgment
be rendered so as to enable him to preserve his right under the law”).
37. See State v. Degree, 110 N.C. App. 638, 641-642, 430 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1993) (holding that
defendant’s failure to request entry of judgment was “tantamount to his consent”).
10
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which the legislature has enacted a mandatory sentencing scheme and
procedure.38
With respect to the conditions attached to a prayer for judg-
ment continued, a trial court may not impose conditions that are tan-
tamount to punishment.39 If the pronounced conditions are inappro-
priately punitive, the court’s order “loses its character as a [prayer for
judgment continued] and becomes a final +udgment.”40 If the rule
were otherwise, a court would essentially be able to punish a defend-
ant more than once for an offense—a violation of constitutional prin-
ciples.41 Thus, the conditions a court may properly attach to a prayer
for judgment continued include the payment of court costs and the re-
$uirement that a defendant “obey the law.”42 The imposition of any
other conditions will result in the conditional prayer for judgment
38. See In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 312, 255 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1979) (holding “that the Courts at
North Carolina do not have an ‘inherent’ power to continue prayer for judgment on conditions . . . where
the sentence is made mandatory by the General Assembly” in an impaired driving case). See also In re
Tucker, 348 N.C. 677, 682, 501 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1998) (declining to discipline a trial judge who entered
PJCs in impaired driving cases because the judge “conceded that he did not have authority to continue
prayer for judgment in a DWI case” after relevant case law was brought to his attention).
39. See State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 683, 100 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1957).
40. State v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. 658, 659, 430 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1993); see also State v. Popp,
197 N.C.App. 226, 228, 676 S.E.2d 613, 614 (2009).
41. See Griffin, 246 N.C. at 683, 100 S.E.2d at 51 (“Punishment having been once inflicted, the
court has exhausted its power and cannot thereafter impose additional punishment.”). See alsoU.S. Const.
amend. V.
42. Brown, 110 N.C. App. at 659, 430 S.E.2d at 434 (1993).
11
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continued being transformed into a final (though possibly illegal)
judgment.43 If a court issues a conditional prayer for judgment con-
tinued and the defendant fails to satisfy the stated conditions, the trial
court may proceed to enter a final judgment and sentence in accord-
ance with the legislatively prescribed sentencing scheme.44 In con-
trast, if a defendant satisfies the stated conditions, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has disapproved of a trial court’s subse$uent attempt
to sentence that defendant.45
In contrast to the conditional prayer for judgment continued,
an unconditional prayer for judgment continued occurs when a judge
imposes no conditions on a defendant, but purposely fails to enter a
final judgment and sentence.46 It has long been held that a trial judge
43. See Popp, 197 N.C. App. at 228, 676 S.E.2d at 615 (finding conditions such as community ser-
vice, a curfew, and drug testing to be tantamount to punishment); Brown, 110 N.C. App. at 660, 430
S.E.2d at 434 (finding mental health treatment to be a condition that transforms a PJC into a final judg-
ment); Griffin, 246 N.C. at 683, 100 S.E.2d at 51 (finding the imposition of a fine to be “inconsistent”
with the entry of a PJC).
44. See State v. Ray, 212 N.C. 748, 194 S.E. 472, 473 (1938) (“The power of the superior court to
continue the prayer for judgment . . . and thereafter, upon determination that the conditions had been
breached, to impose sentence and execute the judgment, has been upheld by this court in numerous
cases.”).
45. See State v. Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, ___, 65 S.E. 1011, 1014 (1909) (stating that, where defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment after satisfying the conditions of the prayer for judgment continued, the
trial court engaged in “a capricious exercise of arbitrary power unknown to the common law and disap-
proved and condemned by many well-considered decisions of the present time”). None of the appellate
decisions issued since Hilton have modified this basic principle of law.
46. See State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 612 S.E.2d 195, cert. denied, 359 N.C. 856, 620
S.E.2d 196 (2005).
12
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may issue this unconditional type of prayer for judgment continued
without a defendant’s consent.47 With unconditional prayers for
+udgment continued, “there is no +udgment, no appeal will lie, and the
case remains in the trial court for appropriate action.”48 If a defend-
ant does not object to the prayer for judgment continued or request
the entry of +udgment sooner, the defendant’s consent to the trial
court’s action will be implied.49 However, if a trial court judge does
not impose a final judgment and sentence within a reasonable period
of time, or if the defendant suffers prejudice as a result of the delayed
entry of judgment, the court will lose jurisdiction and have no author-
ity to impose a judgment and sentence upon the defendant later.50
The reasonableness of any delay between the ascertainment of a de-
fendant’s guilt and the entry of a final +udgment will depend upon
“the reason for the delay, the length of the delay, whether defendant
has consented to the delay, and any actual prejudice to defendant
47. See Griffin, 246 N.C. at 682, 100 S.E.2d at 51; State v. Graham, 225 N.C. 217, 219, 34 S.E.2d
146, 147 (1945); State v. Burgess, 192 N.C. 668, ___, 135 S.E.2d 771, 772 (1926).
48. State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 638, 127 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1962). See also State v. Perry, 316
N.C. 87, 94-95, 340 S.E.2d 450, 455 (1986) (dismissing defendant’s appeal of two offenses where the
trial court entered only unconditional prayers for judgment continued).
49. See State v. Craven, 205 N.C. App. 393, 405, 696 S.E.2d 750, 757 (2010), rev’d on other
grounds, 367 N.C. 517, 44 S.E.2d 458 (2013); State v. Degree, 110 N.C. App. 638, 641-642, 430 S.E.2d
491, 493 (1993).
50. See State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 156, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993).
13
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which results from the delay.”51 Using this analysis, North Carolina
appellate courts have approved delays of up to seven years between
the issuance of the unconditional prayer for judgment continued and
the entry of a final judgment and sentence.52 Similarly, the pro-
nouncement of a final judgment will be upheld even if the judge who
presides over the sentencing hearing is not the same judge who pre-
sided when the defendant was adjudged to be guilty of the offense.53
III. PURPOSES SERVED BY THE USE OF PRAYERS FOR
JUDGMENT CONTINUED IN THE NORTH CAROLINA COURT
SYSTEM
North Carolina courts have used procedural devices like the
prayer for +udgment continued since the 1800’s,54 and they still enter
51. State v. Degree, 110 N.C. App. at 641, 430 S.E.2d at 493 (cited with approval by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 157, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993) (“Our holding
in this case is consistent with” the decision in Degree)).
52. See Craven, 205 N.C. App. at 405, 696 S.E. 2d at 757 (using the State v. Degree analysis to find
a two-year delay between a prayer for judgment continued and sentencing to be reasonable); State v. Van
Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 38-44, 612 S.E.2d 195, 201 (reviewing constitutional due process principles
to determine that the four-year delay between a PJC and the final judgment and sentence did not constitute
judicial or prosecutorial vindictiveness), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005); State v. Lea,
156 N.C. App. 178, 180-182, 576 S.E.2d 131, 133-134 (2003) (upholding judgment after a five-year delay
between the entry of the prayer for judgment continued and the final sentence); State v. Pelley, 221 N.C.
487, ___, 20 S.E.2d 850, 856-857 (1942) (upholding a delay of almost seven years between PJC and final
judgment when prayer for judgment continued was originally for a five-year term and the defendant’s
flight from the jurisdiction prevented the entry of judgment any sooner).
53. See State v. Sauls, 291 N.C. 253, 263-264, 230 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1976).
54. See State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 20 S.E. 513 (1894); State v. Bennett, 20 N.C. 170, 178 (1838).
See also Coates, supra note 8, at 215.
14
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orders continuing the prayer for judgment in various criminal and
motor vehicle cases today.55 The reason for this longevity is that a
court’s power to continue prayer for judgment in a case is important
to the administration of justice in North Carolina. In particular the
prayer for judgment continued allows courts to achieve procedural
fairness,56 to encourage resource-saving case resolutions,57 and to in-
novate when necessary to reach appropriate outcomes in the criminal
and motor vehicle cases that come before them.58 Each of these pur-
poses and example cases are discussed below in turn.
A. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
North Carolina courts use prayers for judgment continued to
help them achieve procedural fairness by giving the parties who ap-
55. See, e.g., State v. Curlee, __ N.C. App. __, 795 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2016); Michael Gordon, No
High School Graduation: Immigrant Teen in North Carolina Must Leave for Mexico,” NEWS &
OBSERVER, Mar. 29, 2017.
56. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334 (2015) (providing that courts may grant a continuance of the
sentencing hearing for good cause); State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 418-419, 268 S.E.2d 879, 880
(quoting trial court order to continue the prayer for judgment to conduct a presentence investigation), cert.
denied, 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980).
57. See, e.g., N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1 (where the charge of
accessory after the fact was dismissed upon a guilty plea and continuance of the prayer for judgment on
the charge of misprision of a felony); Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 305 (2014) (describing a program
where individuals charged with motor vehicle offenses could take a driving course, pay costs, and receive
a prayer for judgment continued); Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, 65 S.E. 1011.
58. See Part III(c) infra.
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pear before the court an opportunity to present information and argu-
ments relevant to the court’s sentencing decision.59 For example, af-
ter a lengthy and hotly contested trial ends in a guilty verdict, a trial
judge may continue the prayer for judgment for a short period to al-
low the parties to gather witnesses or otherwise prepare for the sen-
tencing hearing.60 This procedure ensures that the prosecution and
the defense can present their positions well when the length and emo-
tions of the trial might have impeded their ability to be prepared for
sentencing immediately after the verdict was read.
As an additional example, a trial judge continued the prayer
for judgment in a case where the defendant failed to return to court
after a break and was absent when the jury returned a guilty verdict.61
In this instance, procedural fairness was achieved through the entry
59. See, e.g., State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 418-419, 268 S.E.2d 879, 880 (quoting trial court
order to continue the prayer for judgment to conduct a presentence investigation), cert. denied, 301 N.C.
403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980).
60. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1334 (2015) (providing that courts may grant a continuance of the
sentencing hearing for good cause); State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App. 418, 418-419, 268 S.E.2d 879, 880
(quoting trial court order to continue the prayer for judgment to conduct a presentence investigation), cert.
denied, 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980).
61. See State v. Curlee, __ N.C. App. __, 795 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2016).
16
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of the prayer for judgment continued because it effectuated the de-
fendant’s right to be present and to be heard when the judgment was
pronounced.62
Finally, a prayer for judgment continued ensures procedural
fairness in those cases where multiple, related charges are resolved at
different times.63 For example, when a defendant was found guilty of
one charge, but had to be retried on a related charge due to a hung
jury, the trial court continued the prayer for judgment on the resolved
charge, held the second trial, and then conducted a sentencing hear-
ing. 64 The parties in such a case both had fair opportunities to ac-
count for the outcome of all, not just part, of the defendant’s charges
at the sentencing proceeding.65
B. RESOURCE-SAVING RESOLUTION OF CASES
Serving as another contribution to the administration of jus-
tice in North Carolina, prayers for judgment continued are sometimes
62. See State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330, 126 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1962) (describing the nature of a
defendant’s right to be present at the time of sentencing).
63. See, e.g., State v. Cornelius, 219 N.C. App. 329, 331, 723 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2012) (where trial
court entered a prayer for judgment continued on a first degree burglary charge until the defendant could
be retried on a related murder charge).
64. See State v. Cornelius, 219 N.C. App. 329, 331, 723 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2012) (where trial court
entered a prayer for judgment continued on a first degree burglary charge until the defendant could be
retried on a related murder charge).
65. See id. at 331, 723 S.E.2d at 785.
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used to encourage resource-saving resolutions of criminal and motor
vehicle cases.66 When cases are resolved efficiently, cooperatively,
and without the need for extended court involvement, resources are
saved and justice is served.67 Appellate court decisions reveal that
prayers for judgment continued have served this purpose for over one
hundred years.68
In a 1907, State v. Hilton, a defendant appeared in superior
court to face three counts of unlawful sale of liquor.69 Although he
had witnesses ready to support his defense at trial, the court did not
have adequate time to hear the case during that term of court.70 To
resolve the charges more efficiently than awaiting a trial at a subse-
quent term of court, the parties entered into a plea agreement.71
66. See, e.g., N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1 (where the charge of
accessory after the fact was dismissed upon a guilty plea and continuance of the prayer for judgment on
the charge of misprision of a felony); Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 305 (2014) (describing a program
where individuals charged with motor vehicle offenses could take a driving course, pay costs, and receive
a prayer for judgment continued).
67. See N.C. Comm’n on Admin. of L. & Just., Final Rep. at 21 (Mar. 2017) (noting how a “system
that fails to use its resources effectively or manage its work efficiently will not serve justice”).
68. One of the earliest examples is Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, 65 S.E. 1011.
69. See id.
70. Id.at ___, 65 S.E. at 1012.
71. Id.
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(pon the defendant’s guilty plea to the three charges, the +udge or-
dered the defendant to pay a fine and court costs on one count,72 sus-
pended the judgment on the second count on the condition that the
defendant pay the costs of court, and continued the prayer for judg-
ment on the third count on the condition that the defendant pay costs
and appear back in court from term to term to show good behavior. 73
Although the primary issue in Hilton involved a subse$uent +udge’s
decision to enter judgment after the defendant appeared from term to
term and was discharged in 1908, 74 it was clear that the prayer for
judgment continued facilitated the initial cooperative resolution of
the case.75
A more recent example of a prayer for judgment continued
being used to facilitate the resource-saving resolution of a case is
found in the disposition of the charges against James Johnson, who
was introduced at the beginning of this article.76 Johnson was first
72. Id. at ___, 65 S.E. at 1101.
73. Id.
74. Hilton, 151 N.C. at ___, 65 S.E. at 1012.
75. See id.
76. SeeN.C. CIPRS, Case Summary for State v. James Johnson, Nos. 04 CRS 53580-53581 (Wilson
Co.) (last searched Sept. 20, 2017); N.C. CIPRS, Case Details for State v. Johnson, supra note 1.
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charged with murder, rape, robbery, and kidnapping based on state-
ments, which were later recanted, from the confessed killer.77 When
it was alleged that Johnson’s three-year stay in jail was a result of
racism, the case was reviewed, the primary charges were dropped,
and Johnson was charged instead as an accessory after the fact.78
Although a lengthy trial could have occurred because of Johnson’s
claim that his limited involvement in the crime was out of fear, the
prayer for judgment continued gave closure to individuals on both
sides of the case.79
Turning to one of the most popular uses of the prayer for
judgment continued as a resource-saving means of resolving cases,
trial courts often use this device for motor vehicle offenses.80 In
North Carolina, motor vehicle offenses include everything from non-
77. See N.C. CIPRS, Case Summary for State v. Johnson, supra note 59; A Case Closes, supra note
1.
78. See N.C. CIPRS, Case Summary for State v. Johnson, supra note 59; N.C. CIPRS, Case Details
for State v. Johnson, supra note 1, No. 07 CRS 56748 at 1-2; A Case Closes, supra note 1; James Johnson
Pleads Guilty in Wilson Murder Case, WRAL.COM (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.wral.com/news/lo-
cal/story/4543315/ (last visited Nov. 1,2017).
79. James Johnson Pleads Guilty in Wilson Murder Case, WRAL.COM (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/4543315/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (describing the reaction of the
defendant’s father and the victim’s father to the case resolution).
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 305 (2014) (describing a program where individuals
charged with motor vehicle offenses could take a driving course, pay costs, and receive a prayer for judg-
ment continued).
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criminal infractions81 to misdemeanors82 and felonies,83 with a wide
variety of punishments defined by statute.84 In addition to the penal-
ties prescribed for such offenses, defendants face collateral conse-
quences, such as driver’s license points and increased costs for the
motor vehicle insurance required of all drivers.85 By giving defend-
ants an opportunity to plead guilty and avoid such consequences, the
courts’ use of prayers for judgment continued has “substantially re-
duced the number of cases that the 5A’s office and the courts [are]
required to handle, freeing up resources that could be used for other
matters.”86
C. OPPORTUNITY TO INNOVATEWHEN NECESSARY
Another important function served by prayers for judgment
continued in the administration of justice is providing trial judges
with an opportunity to innovate when necessary to ensure that just
81. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-35, 20-124(a), 20-135.2A & 20-176 (2015) (statutes defining as
offenses the failure to notify DMV of address change, the failure to maintain vehicle breaks, and seat belt
violations).
82. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-28 & 20-138.1 (2015) (provisions defining the offenses of driv-
ing while license suspended and driving while impaired, respectively).
83. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-138.5 & 20-141.4 (defining the offenses of habitual impaired
driving and felony death by vehicle, respectively.
84. See Robert L. Farb, 2015 PUNISHMENT CHART FOR NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES & MOTOR
VEHICLE OFFENSES at 65-94 (Univ. of N.C. Sch. of Gov’t, 2016).
85. See Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 305 n.2 (2014) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-4.01(4a) (a)(4)
& 58-36-75(f) (2014)).
86. Id. at 305.
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punishments are meted out in the cases that come before them. This
use of prayers for judgment continued occurs when the legislative
process directly fails to address the practical realities of cases gener-
ally, or when the issues involved in a specific case are anomalous and
unlikely to have been considered by the legislature when prescribing
the penalties to be applied to an offense.87
One can turn to the history of courts’ use of prayers for judg-
ment continued a for an example of innovation occurring when the
legislative process failed to address practical realities.88 Trial courts
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would often suspend
the imposition of final judgments, enter conditional prayers for judg-
ment continued, and provide defendants with a chance to avoid the
harsh, prescribed punishments for their offenses.89 During much of
this time period, the prescribed penalty for most serious offenses was
87. See SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA
§ 12.5, at 914 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2015).
88. Compare Coates, supra note 12, at 212-213 with State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, __, 20 S.E. 513,
514 (1894) (approving as “beneficial” the use of procedural devices to allow defendants to avoid legisla-
tively authorized punishments).
89. See State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 215, 34 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1945) (noting that the suspended
“imposition or execution of sentence on condition is favorable to the defendant in that it postpones pun-
ishment and gives him an opportunity to escape it altogether”); State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, __, 20 S.E.
513, 514 (1894) (noting that the practice of suspending judgments “has proved very salutary, both in
bringing about the reformation of petty offenders, and in the suppression, especially of certain classes, of
offenses. The . . . beneficial effects of its judicious use have been made so manifest as to commend it
both to the judges and the people.”)
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“death or some form of corporal punishment.” 90 Lesser crimes were
penalized by imprisonment in facilities of such poor condition as to
endanger life and health.91 The North Carolina legislature failed to
respond to the practical reality that such penalties were not always
appropriate for all defendants in all cases,92 but trial court judges still
had to find a way to give appropriate sentences and do justice in the
cases coming before them each day. Hence, in many cases in this
time period, courts used prayers for judgment continued, but required
defendants to do such things as pay court costs, pay a bond and make
periodic appearances in court, pay restitution, and show good con-
duct.93 If defendants failed to comply with the court’s conditions and
90. Coates, supra note 12, at 208.
91. Id. at 225.
92. In 1800, a bill proposing to limit the types of cases requiring the death penalty and to give trial
judges more sentencing discretion in serious cases failed to pass in the North Carolina General Assembly.
See Coates, supra note 12, at 212. Nevertheless, “in succeeding years [the] principle [behind the failed
bill] was adopted in particular cases by slow degrees.” Id. at 213.
93. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 169 N.C. 311, 84 S.E. 767 (1915) (trial court continued prayer for
judgment on the condition that the defendant have good behavior); Hilton, 151 N.C. 687, 65 S.E. 1011
(where trial judge continued the prayer for judgment on the condition that the defendant pay costs, pay an
appearance bond, and appear in court to show good behavior from term to term); Coates, supra note 12,
at 216 (describing various conditions imposed by trial courts). Under current doctrine, when continuing
the prayer for judgment in a case, a trial court can no longer require conditions, such as restitution, that
are tantamount to punishment. See State v. Popp, 197 N.C. App. 226, 676 S.E.2d 613 (2009).
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ruined their second chance, the court would pronounce a final judg-
ment and impose the prescribed penalty.94
Even when the legislative process works properly, today’s
trial courts innovatively use the prayer for judgment continued as a
tool to address individual cases that are anomalous. The types of is-
sues arising in these anomalous cases include instances: (1) when de-
fendants face collateral consequences unaccounted for in the sentenc-
ing laws applicable to their offenses;95 (2) when defendants have
been found guilty of multiple, related offenses;96 or (3) when a judge
“is convinced that the criminal conduct is out of character for the de-
fendant, that the conduct will not be repeated, and the equities of the
situation warrant giving the defendant a second chance.”97
There are a variety of anomalous cases where prayers for
judgment continued were used in an attempt to allow defendants to
94. See State v. Hoggard, 180 N.C. 678, 103 S.E. 891 (1920) (upholding entry of judgment and
sentence when defendant failed to fulfill the conditions upon which prayer for judgment had been contin-
ued).
95. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 55 (describing an 18 year-old facing deportation after his arrest on
an embezzlement charge that was resolved by a misdemeanor guilty plea with the prayer for judgment
being continued).
96. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 267 N.C. 653, 148 S.E.2d 613 (1966) (where defendant had 20
counts of forgery altogether, was sentenced to imprisonment on 12 counts, and was initially granted an
unconditional prayer for judgment continued for three years on 8 counts).
97. SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA §
12.5, at 914 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed.2015).
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avoid collateral consequences.98 One example is a case where, facing
criminal charges, a defendant filed a civil complaint to allege an un-
constitutional abuse of power by the local district attorney’s office.99
If the defendant’s criminal charges were resolved by the entry of fi-
nal judgments, the civil lawsuit would have been dismissed as
moot.100 However, by entering a prayer for judgment continued on
one of the defendant’s charges, the trial court was able to dispose of
the criminal case and avoid imposing on the defendant the collateral
consequence of ending his civil case without consideration of the
substantive issues raised therein.101 It is highly unlikely that the leg-
islature accounted for this type of civil collateral consequence when
it prescribed the potential punishments for the defendant’s of-
fenses.102
98. Although some of these uses of the prayer for judgment continued were successful as described
herein, there are instances where they were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Britt v. N.C. Sheriffs’ Educ. & Train-
ing Standards Comm’n, 348 N.C. 573, 501 S.E.2d 75 (1998) (finding the entry of a prayer for judgment
continued did not help that defendant avoid revocation of his law enforcement certification); State v.
Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779, 781, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1994) (where trial court continued prayer for judgment
on drug offenses so as not “to interfere with defendant’s right to testify” in his upcoming murder trial, but
the guilty pleas on the drug offenses were nevertheless found to be admissible at that trial).
99. See Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 363-65, 451 S.E.2d 858, 862-63 (1994)
100. Id.at 370, 451 S.E.2d at 866-67.
101. Id.
102. An additional example from a lower appellate court decision is Little v. Little, 226 N.C. App.
499, 739 S.E.2d 876 (2013). In Little, the court reviewed a trial court’s issuance of a civil protective order
against a defendant who faced a related criminal assault charge. Id. at 503, 739 S.E.2d at 879. The
criminal court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea but continued the prayer for judgment. Based on the
prayer for judgment continued, the appellate court held that the civil trial court should not have taken
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Appellate court decisions include multiple examples of trial
courts using prayers for judgment continued as innovative tools to
ensure just outcomes in cases that were anomalous because the de-
fendants were guilty of multiple, related offenses.103 In such cases,
trial judges entered final judgments on some counts faced by the de-
fendant, but ordered prayers for judgment continued on other
counts.104 With such defendants receiving significant punishment for
offenses on which judgments were entered, the trial courts’ continu-
ance of the prayer for judgment was usually with the expectation that
punishment might never be imposed for the remaining offenses.105
Yet, as an innovation designed to produce just outcomes, the court
judicial notice of the criminal case nor relied upon that evidence to issue a protective order. Id. at 505,
739 S.E.2d at 881. This ruling meant the prayer for judgment continued should have saved this defendant,
too, from this type of collateral consequence.
103. See, e.g., State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 43, 612 S.E.2d 195, 202, review denied, 359
N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005) (where the defendant received lengthy prison sentences on some charges
and unconditional prayers for judgment continued on other, related charges); State v. Graham, 224 N.C.
347, 349, 30 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1944) (where defendant received an eighteen-month jail sentence on one
count and prayers for judgment continued on two other counts).
104. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 224 N.C. 347, 349, 30 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1944) (where defendant
received an eighteen-month jail sentence on one count and prayers for judgment continued on two other
counts); State v. Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 20 S.E.2d 850 (1942) (where defendant received on one count a
judgment of one-to-two years imprisonment that was suspended for five years on conditions and, on an-
other count, an unconditional prayer for judgment continued for five years); State v. Cheek, 31 N.C. App.
379, 380, 229 S.E.2d 227, 227 (1976) (where defendant received a twenty-year sentence on one count and
an indeterminate, unconditional prayer for judgment continued on another count).
105. See, e.g., State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 43, 612 S.E.2d 195, 202, review denied, 359
N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005) (noting that trial judge initially entered an indeterminate, unconditional
PJC in the belief that the defendant had received “enough” punishment for other related offenses); State
v. Lea, 156 N.C. App. 178, 180, 576 S.E.2d 131, 133 (2003) (noting that trial judge initially entered
indeterminate, unconditional PJCs on two offenses because defendant received “long consecutive active
sentences” for three other related offenses).
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order in these cases could be a double-edged sword for the defend-
ants. On one hand, the defendants immediately escaped punishment
for some of their offenses.106 On the other hand, if the judgments
that were entered against such defendants were reversed on appeal, or
if the defendants engaged in negative conduct which came to the at-
tention of the court, they could be punished for their remaining of-
fenses several years after guilt was established.107 In these circum-
stances, the trial judge would be able to craft a final judgment that,
accounting for the subsequent events in the case, allowed the defend-
ant to “discharge the debt he owes society for the breach of its rules
of good conduct.”108 Had a final judgment instead of a prayer for
judgment continued been entered at the outset, the court would not
have been able to ensure that the defendant received an appropriate
punishment overall.
106. See, e.g., State v. Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. 33, 43, 612 S.E.2d 195, 202, review denied, 359
N.C. 856, 620 S.E.2d 196 (2005) (where the defendant was initially not sentenced on two out of the four
charges of which he was found guilty).
107. See State v. Craven, 205 N.C. App. 393, 696 S.E.2d 750 (2010) (upholding trial court’s authority
to sentence the defendant for offenses, on which prayer for judgment had been continued in 2007, after
the defendant was convicted of new offenses occurring in 2008); Van Trusell, 170 N.C. App. at 33, 612
S.E.2d at 195 (upholding trial court’s authority to enter judgment on charges although the prayer for judg-
ment was continued until the defendant’s successful appeal of judgments rendered on other related
charges).
108. State v. Graham, 225 N.C. 217, 220, 34 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1945).
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The last type of anomalous cases where trial courts use pray-
ers for judgment continued innovatively to reach appropriate out-
comes are cases “where the e$uities of the situation warrant giving
the defendant a second chance.”109 This sometimes arises in cases,
such as the James Johnson case discussed above, where all the parties
and the court agree to and accept that the prayer for judgment contin-
ued is the appropriate method for disposing of the case.110 However,
this situation may also arise in any number of cases that never reach
the appellate courts nor appear in published court opinions. An ex-
ample of this is when a trial court uses the prayer for judgment con-
tinued to craft a case disposition where a defendant is adjudged to be
guilty of an offense that is more serious “on paper” than in reality.
As an illustration, consider how, under North Carolina law, it is a fel-
ony for one to “knowingly and designedly by means of any kind of
false pretense whatsoever . . . obtain or attempt to obtain from any
person within this State any money, goods, property, services, chose
in action, or other thing of value with intent to cheat or defraud any
109. SAMUEL J. RANDALL, IV & RYAN D. STUMP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA §
12.5 at 914 (Matthew Bender, 4th ed. 2015).
110. See supra Part III(b) (describing how a prayer for judgment continued was used to reach a co-
operative, resource-saving resolution of the James Johnson case).
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person.”111 As defined, this crime encompasses defendants who suc-
ceed in obtaining another’s property by use of a false pretense as well
as those defendants who attempt, but do not succeed, in doing so.112
This crime is punishable as a felony whether the item or items at is-
sue are worth ten dollars or ten million dollars.113 It is not difficult to
imagine that a trial judge might find felony punishment to be inap-
propriate for a defendant whose conduct amounted to a mere attempt
to use a false pretense to obtain property that was valued at ten dol-
lars. If the equities of the case otherwise called for it, a prayer for
judgment continued conditioned on the defendant’s payment of court
costs and show of good behavior could be an appropriate and just
outcome that would not have been possible under the regular sentenc-
ing statutes.
Thus, as demonstrated here, prayers for judgment continued
are important tools in the administration of justice in the North Caro-
lina court system. This is a reason why the device has been in use
111. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 (2015).
112. Id.
113. See id. (defining all violations of this statute as felonies but conduct involving items worth
$100,000 or more would be higher level felonies than for items worth less).
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since the nineteenth century and a reason why it needs to be available
for another century’s worth of cases.
IV. THE PRAYER FOR JUDGMENT CONTINUED & THE NORTH
CAROLINA LEGISLATURE
While the courts have used their power to enter prayers for
judgment continued in criminal and motor vehicle cases for over a
century, the North Carolina legislature has done very little to regulate
the use of the device until relatively recently.114 Indeed, although the
General Assembly sometimes enacted provisions to address indi-
rectly matters related to prayers for judgment continued in some
cases,115 it did not enact any explicit restrictions on the courts’ prac-
tices until 2006.116 Since then, the legislature has shown itself to be
more and more willing to carve away at trial courts’ authority to use
prayers for judgment continued, signaling a significant departure
from a tradition of avoiding direct action in this arena.117
114. Compare infra Part IV(b) with infra Part IV(c).
115. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-101(4a) (2015).
116. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-217(e) (2015).
117. Compare infra Part IV(b) with infra Part IV(c).
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A. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
THROUGH LEGISLATION
!efore examining the ,orth Carolina General Assembly’s ac-
tions with respect to prayers for judgment continued in criminal and
motor vehicle cases, one must first examine its authority to regulate
the courts at all in this context. Is the power to order a prayer for
judgment continued an inherent judicial power which cannot be
abridged? Or, as North Carolina’s legislative body, does the General
Assembly have authority to regulate, restrict, or possibly even abol-
ish the practice entirely? The answers to these questions, although
not always clear as a matter of North Carolina law,118 begin with the
Constitution of North Carolina.
Pursuant to the North Carolina State Constitution, the “legis-
lative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State govern-
ment shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”119 This
means that the General Assembly has the exclusive power to legis-
late, but it cannot “deprive the +udicial department of any power or
118. See Stevens H. Clarke, LAW OF SENTENCING, PROBATION, AND PAROLE IN NORTH CAROLINA 1
(2d ed. 1997) (noting that the source of courts’ authority to suspend sentences or continue prayers for
judgment “is not as clear as the source of their authority to impose active imprisonment”).
119. N.C. Const. art. I, § 6.
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jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department
of the government.”120 On the subject of prayers for judgment con-
tinued, North Carolina appellate courts have often referred to the de-
vice as part of “the inherent power of a court having +urisdiction”
over a case.121 An “inherent” +udicial power is a power “within the
scope of the court’s +urisdiction which a court possesses irrespective
of specific grant by constitution or legislation.”122 Inherent judicial
powers are those which cannot be regulated or restricted by the legis-
lature.123 If one agrees that the power to continue the prayer for judg-
ment in a case is an inherent power of a trial court, then one has to
conclude that the legislature cannot constitutionally enact any provi-
sion that might restrict or regulate courts in its use.124 However, the
North Carolina appellate courts’ occasional use of the “inherent” la-
bel to describe their power to continue prayers for judgment is not
enough to end this inquiry.125
120. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1.
121. State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 215, 34 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1945) (emphasis added). See also State
v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 682, 100 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1957); Whedbee v. Powell, 41 N.C. App. 250, 253, 254
S.E.2d 645, 647 (1979).
122. Raymond B. Mallard, Inherent Powers of the Courts of North Carolina, 10 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 2 (Mar. 1974) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 78 (1965)).
123. See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 1.
124. Id.
125. See In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 308, 255 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1979).
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In 1979, the Supreme Court of North Carolina directly con-
fronted this question in the case of In re Greene,126 where it specifi-
cally held that a trial court’s authority in this context “is not a +udicial
power beyond statutory limitation.”127 In re Greene involved a trial
court judge who refused to follow a sentencing statute that required
defendants to serve at least three days in jail for a second conviction
of driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.128 Instead of
following the statute after accepting the defendant’s guilty plea, the
trial judge pronounced a judgment of four months and then sus-
pended all active time on the condition that the defendant comply
with certain requirements.129 Although the facts of In re Greene did
not involve a prayer for judgment continued, the court’s analysis en-
compassed more than its facts, with the court repeatedly referencing
prayers for judgment continued throughout its opinion.130 After re-
viewing the relevant case law and constitutional provisions, the court
126. 297 N.C. 305, 255 S.E.2d 142 .
127. Id. at 311, 255 S.E.2d at 146.
128. Id. at 306-07, 255 S.E.2d at 143.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., id. at 307, 255 S.E.2d at 144 (“We address . . . the claimed ‘inherent’ power of the
court to continue prayer for judgment on conditions or suspend execution of sentence on conditions.”)
(emphasis added). In 1998, the North Carolina Supreme Court eased any doubts about the scope of its
holding from In re Greene when it decided not to censure a trial judge for ordering prayers for judgment
continued in impaired driving cases because the trial judge’s actions were “a result of a mistaken, but
honest, interpretation of the law” governing his authority to use prayers for judgment continued. In re
Tucker, 348 N.C. 677, 683, 501 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1998) (emphasis added).
33
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determined that the “inherent” label used in prior decisions to de-
scribe the power to enter prayers for judgment continued or sus-
pended sentences was “highly misleading.”131 The court reasoned
that courts’ use of these procedural devices is sub+ect to legislative
regulation because the “power to define a crime and prescribe its
punishment originates with the legislative branch,”132 and the courts’
authority in this respect is “derive[d] from the legislative power to
prescribe punishment.”133 This analysis led the court to conclude
that, when the legislature has given courts the discretion to choose
the appropriate punishment for certain types of criminal and motor
vehicle cases, trial judges may utilize a prayer for judgment contin-
ued as an exercise of that judicial discretion.134 Concomitantly, when
the legislature creates a specific, mandatory punishment scheme with
little or no room for discretion, trial judges have no authority to order
a prayer for judgment continued in lieu of the prescribed sentence.135
131. Greene, 297 N.C. at 308, 255 S.E.2d at 144.
132. Id. at 309, 255 S.E.2d at 145.
133. Id. at 308, 255 S.E.2d at 144.
134. Id. at 309-310, 255 S.E.2d at 145.
135. See id. at 312, 255 S.E.2d at 147 (holding, in an impaired driving case, that trial judges may not
continue prayer for judgment on conditions . . . “where the sentence is made mandatory by the General
Assembly”).
34
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In essence, the court determined that legislative action can curtail the
judicial power to continue prayers for judgment.
Although the holding of In re Greene is clear, one complicat-
ing factor in the opinion is that the court expressly limited its holding
to conditional prayers for judgment continued.136 The court excluded
the temporary prayer for judgment continued and the unconditional
prayer for judgment continued from its analysis, leaving room for an
argument that trial courts’ authority to order these other types of
prayers for judgment continued might not be subject to legislative
regulation to the same extent as conditional prayers for judgment
continued.137 Research reveals no North Carolina appellate deci-
sions that have directly addressed this open question. However, in
dicta, the Supreme Court of North Carolina implied that the legisla-
ture has full authority to regulate in this area.138 Specifically, in the
136. Limiting its holding, the Court specifically stated as follows:
We are not here concerned with . . . the plenary inherent power of the courts temporarily to delay, for
judicial purposes, pronouncement of judgment . . . so as to afford time to consider post-trial motions, to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, and for other like purposes contemplated by law and justice. For these
reasons the pronouncement of judgment may be deferred, but only for a reasonable time. We address
only the claimed ‘inherent’ power of the court to continue prayer for judgment on conditions or suspend
execution of sentence on conditions.
Id. at 307, 255 S.E.2d at 144 (emphasis added).
137. See id.; State v. Absher, 335 N.C. 155, 157, 436 S.E.2d 365, 366 (1993) (“In this state, we have
made a distinction between cases in which prayer for judgment is continued with conditions imposed and
cases in which prayer for judgment is continued without any conditions.”)
138. State v. Graham, 225 N.C. 217, 219, 34 S.E.2d 146, 147 (1945).
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1945 decision, State v. Graham, the court explained that “[i]n the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary, sentence does not necessarily have
to be imposed at the same term of court at which the verdict or plea
of guilty was had, and courts of general jurisdiction . . . have the
power to continue the case to a subse$uent term for sentence.”139
This dicta suggests that, if the General Assembly enacts a statute re-
quiring judgment to be entered within a certain period of time after a
guilty verdict or guilty plea, then trial courts will have to follow that
directive.140
The North Carolina Constitution lends additional support to
the proposition that the General Assembly has authority to regulate
temporary and unconditional prayers for judgment continued. The
constitution gives the General Assembly broad authority to create
rules of procedure and practice for the trial courts.141 Given that the
prayer for judgment continued is a procedural device which defers
the imposition of a sentence in a criminal or motor vehicle case, the
139. Id.
140. An example of just such a statutory provision, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331B, is discussed in Part
IV(c) infra, where the legislature restricts the length of time prayers for judgment may be continued in
high-level felony cases.
141. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2).
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legislature’s procedural rule making power under the state constitu-
tion suggests that the General Assembly has constitutional authority
to regulate procedures related to trial courts’ use of temporary and
unconditional prayers for judgment continued. Indeed, there are a
number of statutes which already regulate the manner in which trial
courts conduct sentencing proceedings and render judgments in crim-
inal and motor vehicle cases. The regulation of temporary or uncon-
ditional prayers for judgment continued would be consistent with
such provisions.142 Lastly, there does not appear to be any principled
reason for the legislature’s authority to regulate temporary and un-
conditional prayers for judgment continued to be any different from
its authority to regulate conditional prayers for judgment continued.
For these reasons, any attempt to challenge the legislature’s authority
to regulate or to restrict the courts’ use of any type of prayer for judg-
ment continued – temporary, conditional, or unconditional – is likely
142. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-833 (2015) (giving crime victims the right to be heard at the
time of sentencing); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331(a) (2015) (stating that a “criminal judgment . . . shall be
consistent with the provisions of” the Structured Sentencing Law for offenses within the defined scope of
that law); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.3 (2015) (defining goals to be achieved by a court’s sentencing
decision); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d) & (e) (2015) (describing the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors to be considered by a trial judge when choosing a sentence); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 et seq.
(2015) (mandating special sentencing procedures to apply in capital cases).
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to fail under ,orth Carolina’s Constitution, laws, and appellate deci-
sions.
B. A LEGISLATIVE TRADITION OF NON-ACTION AND
AVOIDANCE
Although the North Carolina legislature has the above-de-
scribed authority to regulate trial courts’ use of prayers for +udgment
continued, the General Assembly did not directly regulate the courts
in such usage until recently. Indeed, while trial judges regularly used
temporary, conditional, and unconditional prayers for judgment con-
tinued during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,143 the North
Carolina General Assembly established a tradition of non-action and
avoidance. When there were issues indicating a need for regulation or
clarity, the General Assembly took either no action or only indirect
actions and consistently avoided any direct regulation of the courts’
use of prayers for judgment continued in criminal and motor vehicle
cases.144
143. See supra Part III (describing how North Carolina courts have used prayers for judgment con-
tinued in criminal and motor vehicle cases).
144. See generally Pelley v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 12, 13 (1941) (describing how “for nearly half a cen-
tury prior to 1937, the trial judges in North Carolina operated a system of probation on their own initiative”
by suspending the execution of sentences or continuing prayers for judgment); In re Greene, 297 N.C.
305, 308-310, 255 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1979) (noting the lack of legislative action when courts used proce-
dural devices as alternative sentencing mechanisms until the General Assembly created a system of pro-
bation in 1937).
38
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol40/iss1/3
70 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:32
One of the earliest examples of legislative non-action was in
the period following the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision
in State v. Crook in 1894.145 Prior to Crook, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina acknowledged how trial courts used various proce-
dures to avoid imposing the prescribed punishment in cases146 and
expressly disapproved of some of those practices.147 Nevertheless,
such practices continued in various forms at the trial court level.148
In Crook, the court appeared to break away from its previous stance
of disapproval and expressed approval of trial +udges’ use of proce-
dural devices to defer sentencing.149 These decisions highlighted the
need for clarity and direction in court practices designed to help de-
fendants avoid overly onerous punishments,150 yet the legislature
145. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 20 S.E. 513 .
146. See State v. Bennett, 20 N.C. 170, 178 (1838) (“We know that a practice has prevailed to some
extent of inflicting fines with a provision that they should be diminished or remitted altogether upon matter
thereafter to be done, or shown to the Court by the person convicted. But we can find no authority in law
for this practice, and feel ourselves bound, upon this first occasion when it is brought judicially to our no-
tice, to declare it illegal.”).
147. See id. (finding trial courts’ use of procedural devices to defer judgments, other than through the
suspension of sentences already pronounced, to be “illegal”).
148. See In re Greene, 297 N.C. at 309, 255 S.E.2d at 145; Coates, supra note 12, at 210 (citing
Bennett, 20 N.C. 170 (describing how courts engaged in the practice of suspending sentences on condi-
tions since 1800 although it was “first condemned”).
149. See In re Greene, 297 N.C. at 309, 255 S.E.2d at 145 (citing Crook, 115 N.C. at 760, 20 S.E. at
513). By 1909, the Court noted how the practice of continuing prayers for judgment is “well established
with us by usage.” Hilton, 151 N.C. at ___, 65 S.E. 1011, 1013-14.
150. Crook, 115 N.C. at 760, 20 S.E. at 514; Coates, supra note 12, at 310.
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took no action for decades.151 When the General Assembly did fi-
nally take action in 1937, it created a statewide system of probation,
152 but did not attempt to develop procedures to guide the courts in
their use of devices like the prayer for judgment continued.
Another example of legislative avoidance concerning prayers
for judgment continued occurred in the period from 1970 to 1977. In
that period, the legislatively-sanctioned Criminal Code Commission
undertook a comprehensive review and analysis of ,orth Carolina’s
criminal procedure laws. The commission studied almost every as-
pect of the procedures used in criminal cases at the trial level and de-
veloped the overarching Criminal Procedure Act, an act adopted by
the legislature that still governs, in amended form, all criminal court
proceedings today.153 Rather than use this as an opportunity to create
clear guidelines for courts’ use of prayers for judgment continued,
the commission and the legislature simply avoided any direct action
151. See In re Greene, 297 N.C. at 310, 255 S.E.2d at 145 (concluding “the General Assembly tacitly
approved, by inaction” of the prevailing court practices).
152. See Act of Mar. 13, 1937, ch. 132, § 1, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 351 (providing that “the judge of
any court of record with criminal jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution of a sentence
and place the defendant on probation”).
153. See N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 15A (2015).
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on the issue.154 For example, in a provision containing definitions for
various terms of art used in the legislation, the phrase “prayer for
+udgment continued” appears once, but not in a provision defining or
explaining its use.155 Instead, the provision defined “entry of +udg-
ment,” and provided that a prayer for judgment continued upon pay-
ment of costs would not be considered a final judgment.156 Once
again, despite having authority to do so, the General Assembly
avoided any attempt to regulate the use of prayers for judgment con-
tinued in the trial courts.
As a final example of this pattern of legislative avoidance,
members of the General Assembly introduced a 1993 bill entitled
“An Act Relating to Prayers for Judgment in Infraction Cases where
the National Safety Council Defensive Driving Course, or a Similar
Approved Course, has been Completed by the Person Cited.”157 In
the original version of this bill, the bill’s sponsors enumerated spe-
cific requirements to be met before a court would grant a prayer for
154. See generally Id.
155. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-101(4a) (2015).
156. Id.
157. N.C. Gen. Assemb. H.B. 1015, 1993 Leg., 1993 Sess. (1st ed.) (N.C. 1993).
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judgment continued to a person charged with committing an infrac-
tion.158 By requiring that the charged individual complete an ap-
proved defensive driving course, pay court costs, and have not re-
ceived a prayer for judgment continued in the preceding five years,159
an apparent goal of this bill was to encourage drivers to take a safe
driving course and thereby improve “driving habits and . . . traffic
safety.”160 However, as trial judges were already continuing prayers
for judgment in cases they deemed appropriate, an indirect result of
this bill was that courts would be restricted from continuing the
prayer for judgment for an infraction when the person charged did
not meet the proposed statutory requirements.
It is not clear the extent to which this specific issue was de-
bated amongst legislators in 1993, but proposed revisions to the bill
suggest that, in line with the tradition of avoidance, legislators at that
time were not willing to place such stringent restrictions on the trial
courts. For example, in the second version of the bill, the application
158. SeeN.C. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 1015, 1993 Leg., 1993 Sess., at 2, lines 27-35 (1st ed.) (N.C. 1993)
(proposing changes to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15a-1114).
159. See Id.
160. See Proposal for Creation of Statewide Availability of Defensive Driving Course as an Alterna-
tive Disposition for Traffic Infractions: Hearing on H.B. 1015 Before the H. Judiciary II Comm.,1993
Leg., 1993 Sess., at 2 (N.C. 1993) (statement describing “highway safety” as a program benefit).
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of the proposed statute was limited to a sub-set of infractions, instead
of all infractions, and the restriction against entering a prayer for
judgment continued for those who had received one in the preceding
five years was removed.161 In the third version of the bill, specific
language was added to further limit the scope of its application, and
to ensure that the legislation did not restrict trial courts’ authority too
much.162 Specific language was added to state that it “shall not be
construed to be the exclusive procedure for the issuance of a prayer
for +udgment continued.”163 In the fourth and final version consid-
ered by the General Assembly, the bill was rewritten simply to sug-
gest a few factors that a judge may consider before deciding whether
to continue the prayer for judgment in the infraction cases covered by
the provision.164 In the end, the work of three different legislative
standing committees and several proposed revisions did not result in
the bill becoming law.165 Once again, the General Assembly stayed
161. SeeN.C. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 1015, 1993 Leg., 1993 Sess., at 2, lines 14-21 (2d ed.) (N.C. 1993)
(limiting scope of bill to those infractions where a mandatory court appearance was not required by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-148).
162. See N.C. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 1015, at 2, lines 15 & 26-27 (3d ed.) (N.C. 1993) (now limiting
the bill’s scope to moving traffic violations for which a court appearance was not mandatory under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-148).
163. Id.
164. See N.C. Gen. Assemb., H.B. 1015, 1993 Leg., 1993 Sess., at 2, lines 16-30 (4th ed.) (N.C.
1993).
165. See H.B. 1015 Vote History, available at http://www.ncleg.net/gas-
cripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=1993&BillID=H1015&submitButton=Go.
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with its tradition of avoidance when it came to regulating the trial
courts’ use of prayers for +udgment continued.
One might point out that variations of the phrase “prayer for
+udgment continued” appear a number of times in ,orth Carolina’s
criminal and motor vehicle laws in an attempt to dismiss the exam-
ples discussed herein as anomalies not indicative of the legislature’s
overarching approach to courts’ use of prayers for +udgment contin-
ued in cases. 166 However, a close examination of the contexts in
which the phrase appears reveals that the General Assembly has, in-
deed, avoided direct regulation of the courts in this area. For exam-
ple, the legislature took an indirect approach to prayers for judgment
continued when it addressed the problem of recidivism in motor vehi-
cle cases.167 Rather than directly regulating when trial courts could
or could not use prayers for judgment continued in cases involving
motorists who have a history of violations, the General Assembly
166. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-415.12 (2015) (where a prayer for judgment continued on certain
offenses will result in the denial of a concealed handgun permit); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534 (2015) (where
one’s obligations under a bail bond terminate upon entry of an indeterminate prayer for judgment contin-
ued in district court); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1381 (2015) (defining “disposition” to include a prayer for
judgment continued); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4a) (2015) (where some prayers for judgment continued
are included in the definition of “conviction”).
167. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4a) (a)(4).
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chose to regulate the impact that the prayer for judgment continued
would have on a motorist’s driving record.168 It enacted a provision
which defined “conviction” to include one’s third or subse$uent
prayer for judgment continued in a five-year period,169 but did not
prevent trial judges from granting one to a motorist who had such a
record.170 Here, the legislature maintained its tradition of avoidance
and opted for an indirect solution instead.
C. THE 21ST CENTURY: A NEW RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATIVE
APPROACH
In stark contrast to the tradition of legislative non-action and
avoidance in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the Gen-
eral Assembly has gone in a new direction for the twenty-first cen-
tury.171 No longer allowing trial and appellate courts to manage
freely how and when a prayer for judgment continued may be used in
a criminal or motor vehicle case, the General Assembly has started to




171. See e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-217(e) (2015) (providing that a violator “shall not receive a prayer
for judgment continued under any circumstances”).
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use of prayers for judgment continued.172 Specifically, on four occa-
sions since the turn of the century, the legislature has expressly pro-
hibited courts from granting prayers for judgment continued to dis-
pose of certain types of cases.
The first time the North Carolina General Assembly broke
away from its tradition of avoidance was in 2006.173 Legislators en-
acted a bill which included an explicit restriction on a trial court’s au-
thority to continue prayer for judgment for defendants adjudged to be
guilty of passing a stopped school bus.174 The formal title of the act,
“An Act to Prevent a Person who is Guilty of Passing a Stopped
School !us from Receiving a Prayer for Judgment Continued,”
demonstrated that the sole purpose of the legislation was to limit the
courts’ power to continue the prayer for judgment in such cases.175
Although the General Assembly took the rare step of directly re-
172. See e.g., id.
173. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-217(e) (2015) (providing that a violator “shall not receive a prayer for
judgment continued under any circumstances”)
174. See id.
175. No Prayer for Judgment/Bus Stop Arm Violation Act, ch. 20, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 2006-160
(2006) (preventing a person guilty of passing a stopped school bus from receiving a prayer for judgement).
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straining +udges’ decision-making powers in these cases, this legisla-
tion was passed without controversy.176 One explanation for the lack
of controversy may be that the bill was strictly tailored to a situation
about which legislators and the public were concerned. Statistics con-
sidered by members of the General Assembly included an estimate
that there were 440,000 violations of the school bus passing law each
year.177 Although 44.8% of those actually charged with the offense
were adjudged to be guilty, 63% of the guilty were granted prayers
for judgment continued by the trial courts.178 Faced with these statis-
tics, and with the fact that the legislation was supported by various
law enforcement and crime control agencies,179 the General Assem-
bly passed this legislation and made it effective on September 1,
2006.180
176. See H.B. 2880 Vote History, (2005-2006 Session) (showing unanimous votes to in both cham-
bers), available at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Ses-
sion=2005&BillID=H2880.
177. See Editorial, Full Stop, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, July 10, 2006 (attached to July 11, 2006
Minutes of Senate Judiciary II Committee) (the committee which approved the bill’s consideration by the
full Senate body).
178. See Bryce Ball and Jim Mills, Legislative Incarceration Fiscal Note for H.B. 2880, N.C. Gen.
Assemb., 2005 Sess., at 2 (N.C. 2006).
179. See Rep. Dale Folwell, Supporters of HB, attached to Minutes of Senate Judiciary II Comm.,
July 11, 2006 & Minutes of H. Comm. on Judiciary IV, Jun. 27, 2006 (listing the NC Department of Crime
Control and Public Safety, the NC Highway Patrol, and the NC Sheriffs’ Association among supporters).
180. See No Prayer for Judgment/Bus Stop Arm Violation Act, ch. 20, 2006 N.C. Sess. L. 2006-160
§ 2 (2006).
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Just one year after the legislature’s first break with the
longstanding tradition of avoidance, the General Assembly adopted
another direct restriction on the +udiciary’s authority to continue
prayers for judgment.181 Specifically, in 2007, the General Assem-
bly enacted a provision to provide that drivers “charged with speed-
ing in excess of 25 miles per hour over the posted speed limit shall be
ineligible for a disposition of prayer for +udgment continued.”182 Alt-
hough this language does not restrict a court from ordering a tempo-
rary prayer for judgment continued,183 it very clearly prohibits trial
judges from ordering long-term conditional or unconditional prayers
for judgment continued that might become the permanent disposition
of a case.184 Around the time of this legislation, public media ac-
counts portrayed prayers for judgment continued in speeding cases as
“legal loopholes” that allowed defendants to obtain undeserved
“deals” and to be let “off easy.”185 This legislation was depicted as the
General Assembly’s attempt to close loopholes in the assessment of
181. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141(p) (2015).
182. Id.
183. See supra Part II (describing temporary prayers for judgment continued as short-term continu-
ances of sentencing proceedings).
184. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141(p) (2015).
185. Pat Stith et al., Cops write tickets, speeders get deals, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 15, 2007 at A1.
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penalties for speeding motorists.186 Unlike the passage of the previ-
ous year’s bill regarding school bus passing violations, this speeding
legislation generated more controversy, with a version being voted
down in each chamber of the General Assembly within a day of its fi-
nal passage.187 One member of the General Assembly specifically
identified legislative micromanagement of the court system as a
source of concern.188 Despite this concern, and despite the legisla-
ture’s previous tradition of avoidance, the bill was passed in a late
night compromise vote.189
Having twice been successful at curtailing judicial authority
to continue prayers for judgment in specific types of motor vehicle
cases, the legislature later moved to restrict the courts’ power in
criminal cases.190 In its 2011-2012 session, the General Assembly
considered and eventually passed legislation with a title clearly stat-
ing that its purpose was to “limit prayers for +udgment continued.”191
186. Pat Stith, Speeding Bill Fails in House Vote, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 2, 2007, at A1; Pat Stith
et al., State Leaders Vow to Close Speed Loopholes, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 22, 2007 at A1.
187. See Speeding Law Changes Vote History, S.B. 925, 2007 Gen. Assemb., (N.C. 2007), (available
at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Ses-
sion=2007&BillID=S925&votesToView=all).
188. See Stith, supra note 186 (describing Representative Tim K. Moore’s opposition to the bill).
189. See supra note 187.
190. See School Violence Prevention Act., 2012 N.C. Sess. L. 149.
191. Id.
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This legislation imposed restrictions on trial courts’ ability to enter
prayers for judgment continued in cases involving upper-level felony
offenses.192 The provision now includes at least 148 defined crimes
within its scope.193 The provision takes away trial +udges’ power to
continue the prayer for judgment for indeterminate periods of time.194
Now, for judges who decide that a prayer for judgment continued is
appropriate, they must not allow the period of deferred judgment to
exceed twenty-four months.195
Despite the broad number of criminal offenses to which this
legislation applied, there was very little debate about it in the North
Carolina House of Representatives where the bill originated.196 The
sponsor of the bill and three other representatives spoke in support of
192. See id.
193. See N.C. Sentencing & Policy Advisory Comm’n, Felony Classification under the Structured
Sentencing Act, at 1-7 (current through Dec. 1, 2016)
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/Felony-list-2016.pdf (last visited Aug.
27, 2017 6:58 am).
194. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331.2 (2015).
195. To reach the maximum twenty-four month period allowed under this legislation, a trial judge
must review the case at least twelve months after the original order was entered and must specifically find
that an additional twelve months “is in the interest of justice.” Id.
196. See H.R. 852, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (originally proposed bill).
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it, describing it as a measure to clarify the scope of prayers for judg-
ment continued and as an attempt to be “tougher on crime.”197 When
this provision was discussed on the House floor, no one voiced any
opposition at any time.198
Most recently, just one year after enacting the prayer for judg-
ment continued restrictions for upper-level felony cases, the legisla-
ture enacted another provision that carved away at the +udiciary’s au-
thority to use the prayer for judgment continued in criminal cases.199
This time, in 2013, the General Assembly did not set out to target the
courts’ authority but, instead, enacted comprehensive legislation to
address the issue of human trafficking in North Carolina.200 The leg-
islation was subjected to several revisions, including a section which
repealed and replaced statutes related to the crime of prostitution.201
197. House Audio Archives (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocu-
ments/2011-2012%20Session/Audio%20Archives/2011/04-28-2011.mp3 (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (re-
marks by Rep. Guice, Rep. Spear, Rep. Engle, & Rep. Faircloth at 239:00 - 244:36).
198. See id.; House Audio Archives (June 18, 2012), http://www.ncleg.net/Docu-
mentSites/HouseDocuments/2011-2012%20Session/Audio%20Archives/2012/06-18-2012.mp3 (last vis-
ited Sept. 19, 2017) (describing Senate Bill 707 prior to an affirmative vote in the House on its second
reading; remarks by Rep. Glazier at 66:25 - 74:32); House Audio Archives (July 12, 2012),
http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2011-2012%20Session/Audio%20Ar-
chives/2012/07-02-2012.mp3 (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) (remarks on conference report for Senate Bill
707 prior to affirmative vote in House; remarks by Rep. Glazier at 136:00 to 138:06).
199. See 2013 N.C. Sess. L. 368 at 1 (N.C. 2013) (entitled in part as “[a]n Act to Create a Safe Harbor
for Victims of Human Trafficking”).
200. See id.
201. Compare id. at §§ 4-5 with S.B. 683, § 5, 2013 N.C. Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013) (ver. 1, Apr. 4,
2013).
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Nearing the end of the legislative process, legislators added a provi-
sion to this section to state that one who commits the crime of solici-
tation of prostitution “shall not be eligible for a disposition of prayer
for judgment continued under any circumstances.”202 Once added to
the bill, this strongly worded restraint on courts’ authority remained
unchanged and went into effect on October 1, 2013.203
Any one of these legislative restrictions, when taken in isolation,
appears to be an appropriate use of the legislative power to regulate
courts’ use of prayers for +udgment continued in criminal and motor
vehicle cases.204 However, this new legislative trend should raise
concerns when these restrictions are viewed together and in compari-
son with an extremely long tradition of legislative avoidance. Will
the legislature continue on this path, curtailing the trial court sys-
tem’s use of prayers for +udgment continued every few years until the
restrictions become a straightjacket on trial +udges’ decision-making
202. See S.B. 683, § 5, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013) (ver. 4 at lines 12-13, Jun. 27, 2013) (em-
phasis added).
203. See 2013 N.C. Sess. L. 368, at §§ 5 & 25 (N.C. 2013).
204. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-217(e) (2015).
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processes in individual cases? Or, can the courts take action to pre-
vent that from happening?
V. HOW TO AVOID A LEGISLATIVE STRAIGHTJACKET?:
MODEST PROPOSALS FOR TRIAL COURT ACTION
Considering the ease with which the legislature has exercised
its authority to restrict the trial courts’ use of prayers for judgment
continued, and considering the frequency with which it has done so
in comparison to its previous tradition of avoidance, the time has
come for ,orth Carolina’s trial courts to take action. The legislature
may have the constitutional authority to regulate in this area, but the
court system can certainly encourage the General Assembly to return
to a more restrained approach. Given the history and purposes be-
hind the courts’ use of prayers for +udgment continued in criminal
and motor vehicle cases, court actors should not stand by and do
nothing. Instead, courts should seriously consider implementing the
following steps:
(1) Acknowledge and publicly discuss the new, restrictive
legislative trend;
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(2) Communicate to legislators and others the important
role prayers for judgment continued have in the ad-
ministration of justice;
(3) Maintain high standards when using prayers for judg-
ment continued to avoid possible abuses; and
(4) Be more transparent about the parameters and justifi-
cations for a prayer for judgment continued in an indi-
vidual case.
One of the striking features of the current legislative trend for
prayers for judgment continued is the relative lack of controversy
surrounding the enactment of each restrictive provision.205 It is not
clear why this issue was not strongly debated in the General Assem-
bly each time it arose.206 It is also not clear why there was no public
outcry or debate by the lawyers, judges, and court personnel who
205. See supra Part IV(C).
206. It is worth exploring elsewhere whether the explanation for current legislative trends may simply
be that today’s General Assembly has fewer lawyers in its ranks. See Leo Daughtry, Lawyers in the
Legislature, N.C. State Bar J. at 19 (Summ. 2017) (describing the “marked decrease” of lawyers in today’s
legislature compared to forth years ago). The lack of lawyer-legislators would certainly have an impact
on any matters affecting the court system because “lawyers in the general assembly [can] explain that our
courts must be able to redress the wrongful acts and the individuals who commit them. The high profile
cases generally have facts that support their results—facts that are not explained or understood. Lawyers
help educate other members of the general assembly.” Id.
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were familiar with prayers for judgment continued and their use in
the trial court system.207 Quite possibly, the longstanding legislative
tradition of avoidance plus the topic-focused nature of each re-
striction lulled the most informed individuals into complacency. If
court actors acknowledge what has happened thus far in the twenty-
first century, study how the new restrictions impact the court system,
and start conversations about this issue publicly, then the compla-
cency may end. At that point, having followed the first step proposed
here, individuals can work on developing better solutions to the prob-
lems which led legislators to enact these restrictions in the first place.
As a second step in addressing the recent curtailment of courts’
power to grant prayers for judgment continued, individuals who work
every day within the trial court system need to educate legislators, the
media, and members of the public about the contributions the prayer
for judgment continued makes in the administration of justice. They
need to explain to those who do not work within the court system
207. Comments from court actors and other members of the public were noticeably missing from
news coverage about the then-proposed bill. See, e.g., Pat Stith et al., Speeding Bill Fails in House Vote,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 2, 2007) at A1; Editorial, A Ticket System Fix, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 31,
2007); Pat Stith et al., State Leaders Vow to Close Speed Loopholes, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 22, 2007).
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how judges need to be able to address anomalous cases because the
legislative process cannot anticipate or account for the various ways
an individual defendant’s situation or conduct might deviate from the
norm. They should describe to others how, when overseeing approx-
imately 2.3 million criminal and motor vehicle cases in a year,208 trial
courts need devices like the prayer for judgment continued to encour-
age cooperative case resolutions and avoid the need for lengthy, re-
source-draining methods to dispose of such cases. In addition, they
can point out that any alleged overuse of prayers for judgment con-
tinued in some cases might be the courts’ way of innovating to han-
dle systemic problems that need legislative attention beyond simply
curtailing judicial authority. For example, the alleged overuse of
prayers for judgment continued in speeding cases in the past209 could
have been a signal that legislators needed to address the systemic
problem of overcrowded dockets.210 If trial court actors take the step
208. See N.C. Admin. Office of the Cts., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL
BRANCH at 12-13 (2015-2016), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Publications/Docu-
ments/2015-16_North_Carolina_Judicial_Branch_Annual_Report.pdf (reporting how superior trial
courts disposed of 143,465 criminal and 8,280 traffic cases in 2015-2016 while district trial courts dis-
posed of 584,631 criminal, 967,985 traffic, and 614,357 infraction cases).
209. See Pat Stith et al., Cops write tickets, speeders get deals, NEWS & OBSERVER, May 15, 2007,
at A1.
210. Cf. Paul Tharp, Investigation into Mecklenburg PJC arrangement begins” N.C. LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Aug. 27, 2010 (describing as beneficial a program using prayers for judgment continued in
traffic cases in a county with “a large caseload” because of its ability to ;promote[] efficient use of valuable
time and resources”).
56
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol40/iss1/3
88 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:32
of communicating to others about the utility of the prayer for judg-
ment continued, legislators might undertake the difficult policy work
required to address such problems directly.
Turning to the third recommendation above, trial judges and court
actors need to be attentive to the standards they use when prayers for
judgment continued are involved. As the North Carolina Supreme
Court cautioned long ago, “the practice should not be readily or hast-
ily enlarged and extended to occasions which might result in unusual
punishment or unusual methods of administering the criminal
law.”211 After all, by continuing the prayer for judgment, a trial
judge may frustrate public expectations and legislative prescriptions
that a defendant be punished once guilt is established. The public
and the legislature need to know that a trial judge in a case did not
continue the prayer for judgment based on improper factors, such as
favoritism instead of fairness, or prejudice instead of justice.212 In
211. Hilton, 151 N.C. at ___, 65 S.E. 1011, 1014.
212. See Thomasi McDonald, Sheriff’s daughter gets a rare deal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 2011,
at 1B (where prosecutor described outcome in Harrison’s case as “in the best interest of justice” despite
appearances that it was “biased” because Harrison is a sheriff’s daughter).
57
Gonder-Stanley: Facing a Legislative Straightjacket in the 21st Century: North Ca
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2017
2017] LEGISLATIVE STRAIGHTJACKET 89
addition, because the public may scrutinize closely a +udge’s deliber-
ate decision not to pronounce a sentence and final judgment on a de-
fendant, courts must ensure that the procedures used in connection
with the prayer for judgment continued are unassailable.213 Demon-
strated compliance with procedures and rules related to prayers for
judgment continued may assuage some of the concerns that led the
legislature to curtail judicial authority as it has recently done.
Closely related to the maintenance of high standards is the fourth
recommendation for court action–that trial judges be much more
transparent about their decisions to continue the prayer for judgment
in cases. Transparency means more than acting with high standards.
It means documenting one’s compliance with those standards and al-
lowing the public access to said documentation. Currently, the only
criminal trial court proceedings recorded by court reporters and avail-
able to be transcribed are those occurring in superior court.214 Crimi-
nal proceedings in district court are generally not recorded,215 but
213. Cf. Tharp, supra note 210 (describing questions raised about the legality of local procedures
used to enter prayers for judgment continued in motor vehicle cases after the defendants attended driving
school).
214. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1241 (2015).
215. See State v. Gurganus, 71 N.C. App. 95, 99, 321 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1984) (“District Criminal
Courts are not courts of record.”)
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judges in either court should make an effort to record a few brief de-
tails about any decision to continue the prayer for judgment in a case.
The most important details to record might include: (1) the type of
prayer for judgment continued intended by the judge (temporary,
conditional, or unconditional); (2) whether there is a possibility for
the prayer for judgment continued to become the permanent disposi-
tion of the case (such as upon the defendant’s compliance with the
announced conditions); and (3) the reasons for the decision. To
avoid an undue burden on court personnel, this documentation could
be in the form of a template “order continuing prayer for +udgment”
to allow the +udge’s decision to be recorded by doing no more than
checking off a few boxes on the template or adding a few lines of
text. Such transparency through documentation will help outsiders
see that such decisions have legitimate bases and clear parameters.
Although taking the actions proposed here will not guarantee
to the court system that legislators will reverse their current restric-
tive course or show restraint in the future, such acts will not make the
situation any worse. The legislature has already enacted provisions
to restrict the courts in their use of prayers for judgment continued
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and trial judges need to do something to preserve what is left of their
authority to use the device.
VI. CONCLUSION
North Carolina courts have exercised the authority to continue
the prayer for judgment in criminal and motor vehicle cases for more
than one hundred years. The longevity of this device is a testament
to its usefulness in the administration of justice. Although the legis-
lature has constitutional authority to regulate or restrict courts’ use of
this device, the recent enactment of provisions curtailing courts’ au-
thority in this area is a significant break from a longstanding legisla-
tive tradition of avoidance. In view of this new legislative trend, the
North Carolina court system must take action to ensure the beneficial
role of prayers for judgment continued can continue for at least an-
other 100 years.
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